--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007, Cameron Rich
+ *
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * * Neither the name of the axTLS project nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR
+ * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
+ * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Common ssl/tlsv1 code to both the client and server implementations.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include "ssl.h"
+
+/* The session expiry time */
+#define SSL_EXPIRY_TIME (CONFIG_SSL_EXPIRY_TIME*3600)
+
+static const uint8_t g_hello_request[] = { HS_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0 };
+static const uint8_t g_chg_cipher_spec_pkt[] = { 1 };
+static const char * server_finished = "server finished";
+static const char * client_finished = "client finished";
+
+static int do_handshake(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int read_len);
+static void set_key_block(SSL *ssl, int is_write);
+static int verify_digest(SSL *ssl, int mode, const uint8_t *buf, int read_len);
+static void *crypt_new(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key, uint8_t *iv, int is_decrypt);
+static int send_raw_packet(SSL *ssl, uint8_t protocol);
+
+/**
+ * The server will pick the cipher based on the order that the order that the
+ * ciphers are listed. This order is defined at compile time.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+const uint8_t ssl_prot_prefs[NUM_PROTOCOLS] =
+{ SSL_RC4_128_SHA };
+#else
+static void session_free(SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessions[], int sess_index);
+
+const uint8_t ssl_prot_prefs[NUM_PROTOCOLS] =
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_PROT_LOW /* low security, fast speed */
+{ SSL_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_AES128_SHA, SSL_AES256_SHA, SSL_RC4_128_MD5 };
+#elif CONFIG_SSL_PROT_MEDIUM /* medium security, medium speed */
+{ SSL_AES128_SHA, SSL_AES256_SHA, SSL_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_RC4_128_MD5 };
+#else /* CONFIG_SSL_PROT_HIGH */ /* high security, low speed */
+{ SSL_AES256_SHA, SSL_AES128_SHA, SSL_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_RC4_128_MD5 };
+#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE */
+
+/**
+ * The cipher map containing all the essentials for each cipher.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+static const cipher_info_t cipher_info[NUM_PROTOCOLS] =
+{
+ { /* RC4-SHA */
+ SSL_RC4_128_SHA, /* RC4-SHA */
+ 16, /* key size */
+ 0, /* iv size */
+ 2*(SHA1_SIZE+16), /* key block size */
+ 0, /* no padding */
+ SHA1_SIZE, /* digest size */
+ hmac_sha1, /* hmac algorithm */
+ (crypt_func)RC4_crypt, /* encrypt */
+ (crypt_func)RC4_crypt /* decrypt */
+ },
+};
+#else
+static const cipher_info_t cipher_info[NUM_PROTOCOLS] =
+{
+ { /* AES128-SHA */
+ SSL_AES128_SHA, /* AES128-SHA */
+ 16, /* key size */
+ 16, /* iv size */
+ 2*(SHA1_SIZE+16+16), /* key block size */
+ 16, /* block padding size */
+ SHA1_SIZE, /* digest size */
+ hmac_sha1, /* hmac algorithm */
+ (crypt_func)AES_cbc_encrypt, /* encrypt */
+ (crypt_func)AES_cbc_decrypt /* decrypt */
+ },
+ { /* AES256-SHA */
+ SSL_AES256_SHA, /* AES256-SHA */
+ 32, /* key size */
+ 16, /* iv size */
+ 2*(SHA1_SIZE+32+16), /* key block size */
+ 16, /* block padding size */
+ SHA1_SIZE, /* digest size */
+ hmac_sha1, /* hmac algorithm */
+ (crypt_func)AES_cbc_encrypt, /* encrypt */
+ (crypt_func)AES_cbc_decrypt /* decrypt */
+ },
+ { /* RC4-SHA */
+ SSL_RC4_128_SHA, /* RC4-SHA */
+ 16, /* key size */
+ 0, /* iv size */
+ 2*(SHA1_SIZE+16), /* key block size */
+ 0, /* no padding */
+ SHA1_SIZE, /* digest size */
+ hmac_sha1, /* hmac algorithm */
+ (crypt_func)RC4_crypt, /* encrypt */
+ (crypt_func)RC4_crypt /* decrypt */
+ },
+ /*
+ * This protocol is from SSLv2 days and is unlikely to be used - but was
+ * useful for testing different possible digest algorithms.
+ */
+ { /* RC4-MD5 */
+ SSL_RC4_128_MD5, /* RC4-MD5 */
+ 16, /* key size */
+ 0, /* iv size */
+ 2*(MD5_SIZE+16), /* key block size */
+ 0, /* no padding */
+ MD5_SIZE, /* digest size */
+ hmac_md5, /* hmac algorithm */
+ (crypt_func)RC4_crypt, /* encrypt */
+ (crypt_func)RC4_crypt /* decrypt */
+ },
+};
+#endif
+
+static void prf(const uint8_t *sec, int sec_len, uint8_t *seed, int seed_len,
+ uint8_t *out, int olen);
+static const cipher_info_t *get_cipher_info(uint8_t cipher);
+static void increment_read_sequence(SSL *ssl);
+static void increment_write_sequence(SSL *ssl);
+static void add_hmac_digest(SSL *ssl, int snd, uint8_t *hmac_header,
+ const uint8_t *buf, int buf_len, uint8_t *hmac_buf);
+
+/* win32 VC6.0 doesn't have variadic macros */
+#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE)
+void DISPLAY_BYTES(SSL *ssl, const char *format,
+ const uint8_t *data, int size, ...) {}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Establish a new client/server context.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC SSL_CTX *STDCALL ssl_ctx_new(uint32_t options, int num_sessions)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof (SSL_CTX));
+ ssl_ctx->options = options;
+
+ if (load_key_certs(ssl_ctx) < 0)
+ {
+ free(ssl_ctx); /* can't load our key/certificate pair, so die */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ ssl_ctx->num_sessions = num_sessions;
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX_MUTEX_INIT(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ if (num_sessions)
+ {
+ ssl_ctx->ssl_sessions = (SSL_SESSION **)
+ calloc(1, num_sessions*sizeof(SSL_SESSION *));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ssl_ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove a client/server context.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC void STDCALL ssl_ctx_free(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
+{
+ SSL *ssl;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ssl_ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ ssl = ssl_ctx->head;
+
+ /* clear out all the ssl entries */
+ while (ssl)
+ {
+ SSL *next = ssl->next;
+ ssl_free(ssl);
+ ssl = next;
+ }
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ /* clear out all the sessions */
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_ctx->num_sessions; i++)
+ session_free(ssl_ctx->ssl_sessions, i);
+
+ free(ssl_ctx->ssl_sessions);
+#endif
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < CONFIG_SSL_MAX_CERTS && ssl_ctx->certs[i].buf)
+ {
+ free(ssl_ctx->certs[i].buf);
+ ssl_ctx->certs[i++].buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+ remove_ca_certs(ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx);
+#endif
+ ssl_ctx->chain_length = 0;
+ SSL_CTX_MUTEX_DESTROY(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ RSA_free(ssl_ctx->rsa_ctx);
+ RNG_terminate();
+ free(ssl_ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any used resources used by this connection.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC void STDCALL ssl_free(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
+
+ if (ssl == NULL) /* just ignore null pointers */
+ return;
+
+ /* spec says we must notify when we are dying */
+ send_alert(ssl, SSL_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+
+ ssl_ctx = ssl->ssl_ctx;
+
+ SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+ /* adjust the server SSL list */
+ if (ssl->prev)
+ ssl->prev->next = ssl->next;
+ else
+ ssl_ctx->head = ssl->next;
+
+ if (ssl->next)
+ ssl->next->prev = ssl->prev;
+ else
+ ssl_ctx->tail = ssl->prev;
+
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+ /* may already be free - but be sure */
+ free(ssl->encrypt_ctx);
+ free(ssl->decrypt_ctx);
+ disposable_free(ssl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+ x509_free(ssl->x509_ctx);
+#endif
+
+ free(ssl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the SSL connection and send any alerts for various errors.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_read(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **in_data)
+{
+ int ret = basic_read(ssl, in_data);
+
+ /* check for return code so we can send an alert */
+ if (ret < SSL_OK)
+ {
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST)
+ {
+ send_alert(ssl, ret);
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ /* something nasty happened, so get rid of this session */
+ kill_ssl_session(ssl->ssl_ctx->ssl_sessions, ssl);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write application data to the client
+ */
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_write(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *out_data, int out_len)
+{
+ int n = out_len, nw, i, tot = 0;
+
+ /* maximum size of a TLS packet is around 16kB, so fragment */
+ do
+ {
+ nw = n;
+
+ if (nw > RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) /* fragment if necessary */
+ nw = RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ if ((i = send_packet(ssl, PT_APP_PROTOCOL_DATA,
+ &out_data[tot], nw)) <= 0)
+ {
+ out_len = i; /* an error */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tot += i;
+ n -= i;
+ } while (n > 0);
+
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add a certificate to the certificate chain.
+ */
+int add_cert(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, const uint8_t *buf, int len)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERT_DEFINED, i = 0;
+ SSL_CERT *ssl_cert;
+ X509_CTX *cert = NULL;
+ int offset;
+
+ while (ssl_ctx->certs[i].buf && i < CONFIG_SSL_MAX_CERTS)
+ i++;
+
+ if (i == CONFIG_SSL_MAX_CERTS) /* too many certs */
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+ printf("Error: maximum number of certs added - change of "
+ "compile-time configuration required\n");
+#endif
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = x509_new(buf, &offset, &cert)))
+ goto error;
+
+#if defined (CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE)
+ if (ssl_ctx->options & SSL_DISPLAY_CERTS)
+ x509_print(cert, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ ssl_cert = &ssl_ctx->certs[i];
+ ssl_cert->size = len;
+ ssl_cert->buf = (uint8_t *)malloc(len);
+ memcpy(ssl_cert->buf, buf, len);
+ ssl_ctx->chain_length++;
+ len -= offset;
+ ret = SSL_OK; /* ok so far */
+
+ /* recurse? */
+ if (len > 0)
+ {
+ ret = add_cert(ssl_ctx, &buf[offset], len);
+ }
+
+error:
+ x509_free(cert); /* don't need anymore */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+/**
+ * Add a certificate authority.
+ */
+int add_cert_auth(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, const uint8_t *buf, int len)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERT_DEFINED;
+ int i = 0;
+ int offset;
+ CA_CERT_CTX *ca_cert_ctx;
+
+ if (ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx == NULL)
+ ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx = (CA_CERT_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(CA_CERT_CTX));
+
+ ca_cert_ctx = ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx;
+
+ while (i < CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS && ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])
+ i++;
+
+ if (i > CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS)
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+ printf("Error: maximum number of CA certs added - change of "
+ "compile-time configuration required\n");
+#endif
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = x509_new(buf, &offset, &ca_cert_ctx->cert[i])))
+ goto error;
+
+ len -= offset;
+ ret = SSL_OK; /* ok so far */
+
+ /* recurse? */
+ if (len > 0)
+ ret = add_cert_auth(ssl_ctx, &buf[offset], len);
+
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve an X.509 distinguished name component
+ */
+EXP_FUNC const char * STDCALL ssl_get_cert_dn(const SSL *ssl, int component)
+{
+ if (ssl->x509_ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ switch (component)
+ {
+ case SSL_X509_CERT_COMMON_NAME:
+ return ssl->x509_ctx->cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME];
+
+ case SSL_X509_CERT_ORGANIZATION:
+ return ssl->x509_ctx->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION];
+
+ case SSL_X509_CERT_ORGANIZATIONAL_NAME:
+ return ssl->x509_ctx->cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT];
+
+ case SSL_X509_CA_CERT_COMMON_NAME:
+ return ssl->x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn[X509_COMMON_NAME];
+
+ case SSL_X509_CA_CERT_ORGANIZATION:
+ return ssl->x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATION];
+
+ case SSL_X509_CA_CERT_ORGANIZATIONAL_NAME:
+ return ssl->x509_ctx->ca_cert_dn[X509_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT];
+
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Find an ssl object based on the client's file descriptor.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC SSL * STDCALL ssl_find(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, int client_fd)
+{
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ ssl = ssl_ctx->head;
+
+ /* search through all the ssl entries */
+ while (ssl)
+ {
+ if (ssl->client_fd == client_fd)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ return ssl;
+ }
+
+ ssl = ssl->next;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Force the client to perform its handshake again.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_renegotiate(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+
+ disposable_new(ssl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_ENABLE_CLIENT
+ if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT))
+ {
+ ret = do_client_connect(ssl);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ send_packet(ssl, PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL,
+ g_hello_request, sizeof(g_hello_request));
+ SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_NEED_RECORD);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Get what we need for key info.
+ * @param cipher [in] The cipher information we are after
+ * @param key_size [out] The key size for the cipher
+ * @param iv_size [out] The iv size for the cipher
+ * @return The amount of key information we need.
+ */
+static const cipher_info_t *get_cipher_info(uint8_t cipher)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_PROTOCOLS; i++)
+ {
+ if (cipher_info[i].cipher == cipher)
+ {
+ return &cipher_info[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL; /* error */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a new ssl context for a new connection.
+ */
+SSL *ssl_new(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, int client_fd)
+{
+ SSL *ssl = (SSL *)calloc(1, sizeof(SSL));
+ ssl->ssl_ctx = ssl_ctx;
+ ssl->need_bytes = SSL_RECORD_SIZE; /* need a record */
+ ssl->client_fd = client_fd;
+ ssl->flag = SSL_NEED_RECORD;
+ ssl->bm_data = ssl->bm_all_data+BM_RECORD_OFFSET; /* space at the start */
+ ssl->hs_status = SSL_NOT_OK; /* not connected */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ENABLE_VERIFICATION
+ ssl->ca_cert_ctx = ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx;
+#endif
+ disposable_new(ssl);
+
+ /* a bit hacky but saves a few bytes of memory */
+ ssl->flag |= ssl_ctx->options;
+ SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+ if (ssl_ctx->head == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl_ctx->head = ssl;
+ ssl_ctx->tail = ssl;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ssl->prev = ssl_ctx->tail;
+ ssl_ctx->tail->next = ssl;
+ ssl_ctx->tail = ssl;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ return ssl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a private key to a context.
+ */
+int add_private_key(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSLObjLoader *ssl_obj)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+
+ /* get the private key details */
+ if (asn1_get_private_key(ssl_obj->buf, ssl_obj->len, &ssl_ctx->rsa_ctx))
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_KEY;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Increment the read sequence number (as a 64 bit endian indepenent #)
+ */
+static void increment_read_sequence(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ if (++ssl->read_sequence[i])
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Increment the read sequence number (as a 64 bit endian indepenent #)
+ */
+static void increment_write_sequence(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ if (++ssl->write_sequence[i])
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Work out the HMAC digest in a packet.
+ */
+static void add_hmac_digest(SSL *ssl, int mode, uint8_t *hmac_header,
+ const uint8_t *buf, int buf_len, uint8_t *hmac_buf)
+{
+ int hmac_len = buf_len + 8 + SSL_RECORD_SIZE;
+ uint8_t *t_buf = (uint8_t *)alloca(hmac_len+10);
+
+ memcpy(t_buf, (mode == SSL_SERVER_WRITE || mode == SSL_CLIENT_WRITE) ?
+ ssl->write_sequence : ssl->read_sequence, 8);
+ memcpy(&t_buf[8], hmac_header, SSL_RECORD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&t_buf[8+SSL_RECORD_SIZE], buf, buf_len);
+
+ ssl->cipher_info->hmac(t_buf, hmac_len,
+ (mode == SSL_SERVER_WRITE || mode == SSL_CLIENT_READ) ?
+ ssl->server_mac : ssl->client_mac,
+ ssl->cipher_info->digest_size, hmac_buf);
+
+#if 0
+ print_blob("record", ssl->hmac_tx, SSL_RECORD_SIZE);
+ print_blob("buf", buf, buf_len);
+ if (mode == SSL_SERVER_WRITE || mode == SSL_CLIENT_WRITE)
+ {
+ print_blob("write seq", ssl->write_sequence, 8);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ print_blob("read seq", ssl->read_sequence, 8);
+ }
+
+ if (mode == SSL_SERVER_WRITE || mode == SSL_CLIENT_READ)
+ {
+ print_blob("server mac",
+ ssl->server_mac, ssl->cipher_info->digest_size);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ print_blob("client mac",
+ ssl->client_mac, ssl->cipher_info->digest_size);
+ }
+ print_blob("hmac", hmac_buf, SHA1_SIZE);
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that the digest of a packet is correct.
+ */
+static int verify_digest(SSL *ssl, int mode, const uint8_t *buf, int read_len)
+{
+ uint8_t hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE];
+ int hmac_offset;
+
+ if (ssl->cipher_info->padding_size)
+ {
+ hmac_offset = read_len-buf[read_len-1]-ssl->cipher_info->digest_size-1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ hmac_offset = read_len - ssl->cipher_info->digest_size;
+ }
+
+ /* sanity check the offset */
+ if (hmac_offset < 0)
+ {
+ return SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HMAC;
+ }
+
+ ssl->hmac_header[3] = hmac_offset >> 8; /* insert size */
+ ssl->hmac_header[4] = hmac_offset & 0xff;
+ add_hmac_digest(ssl, mode, ssl->hmac_header, buf, hmac_offset, hmac_buf);
+
+ if (memcmp(hmac_buf, &buf[hmac_offset], ssl->cipher_info->digest_size))
+ {
+ return SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HMAC;
+ }
+
+ return hmac_offset;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add a packet to the end of our sent and received packets, so that we may use
+ * it to calculate the hash at the end.
+ */
+void add_packet(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *pkt, int len)
+{
+ MD5_Update(&ssl->dc->md5_ctx, pkt, len);
+ SHA1_Update(&ssl->dc->sha1_ctx, pkt, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Work out the MD5 PRF.
+ */
+static void p_hash_md5(const uint8_t *sec, int sec_len,
+ uint8_t *seed, int seed_len, uint8_t *out, int olen)
+{
+ uint8_t a1[128];
+
+ /* A(1) */
+ hmac_md5(seed, seed_len, sec, sec_len, a1);
+ memcpy(&a1[MD5_SIZE], seed, seed_len);
+ hmac_md5(a1, MD5_SIZE+seed_len, sec, sec_len, out);
+
+ while (olen > MD5_SIZE)
+ {
+ uint8_t a2[MD5_SIZE];
+ out += MD5_SIZE;
+ olen -= MD5_SIZE;
+
+ /* A(N) */
+ hmac_md5(a1, MD5_SIZE, sec, sec_len, a2);
+ memcpy(a1, a2, MD5_SIZE);
+
+ /* work out the actual hash */
+ hmac_md5(a1, MD5_SIZE+seed_len, sec, sec_len, out);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Work out the SHA1 PRF.
+ */
+static void p_hash_sha1(const uint8_t *sec, int sec_len,
+ uint8_t *seed, int seed_len, uint8_t *out, int olen)
+{
+ uint8_t a1[128];
+
+ /* A(1) */
+ hmac_sha1(seed, seed_len, sec, sec_len, a1);
+ memcpy(&a1[SHA1_SIZE], seed, seed_len);
+ hmac_sha1(a1, SHA1_SIZE+seed_len, sec, sec_len, out);
+
+ while (olen > SHA1_SIZE)
+ {
+ uint8_t a2[SHA1_SIZE];
+ out += SHA1_SIZE;
+ olen -= SHA1_SIZE;
+
+ /* A(N) */
+ hmac_sha1(a1, SHA1_SIZE, sec, sec_len, a2);
+ memcpy(a1, a2, SHA1_SIZE);
+
+ /* work out the actual hash */
+ hmac_sha1(a1, SHA1_SIZE+seed_len, sec, sec_len, out);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Work out the PRF.
+ */
+static void prf(const uint8_t *sec, int sec_len, uint8_t *seed, int seed_len,
+ uint8_t *out, int olen)
+{
+ int len, i;
+ const uint8_t *S1, *S2;
+ uint8_t xbuf[256]; /* needs to be > the amount of key data */
+ uint8_t ybuf[256]; /* needs to be > the amount of key data */
+
+ len = sec_len/2;
+ S1 = sec;
+ S2 = &sec[len];
+ len += (sec_len & 1); /* add for odd, make longer */
+
+ p_hash_md5(S1, len, seed, seed_len, xbuf, olen);
+ p_hash_sha1(S2, len, seed, seed_len, ybuf, olen);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
+ out[i] = xbuf[i] ^ ybuf[i];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a master secret based on the client/server random data and the
+ * premaster secret.
+ */
+void generate_master_secret(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *premaster_secret)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[128]; /* needs to be > 13+32+32 in size */
+ strcpy((char *)buf, "master secret");
+ memcpy(&buf[13], ssl->dc->client_random, SSL_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&buf[45], ssl->dc->server_random, SSL_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ prf(premaster_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE, buf, 77, ssl->dc->master_secret,
+ SSL_SECRET_SIZE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a 'random' blob of data used for the generation of keys.
+ */
+static void generate_key_block(uint8_t *client_random, uint8_t *server_random,
+ uint8_t *master_secret, uint8_t *key_block, int key_block_size)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[128];
+ strcpy((char *)buf, "key expansion");
+ memcpy(&buf[13], server_random, SSL_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&buf[45], client_random, SSL_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ prf(master_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE, buf, 77, key_block, key_block_size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Calculate the digest used in the finished message. This function also
+ * doubles up as a certificate verify function.
+ */
+void finished_digest(SSL *ssl, const char *label, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ uint8_t mac_buf[128];
+ uint8_t *q = mac_buf;
+ MD5_CTX md5_ctx = ssl->dc->md5_ctx;
+ SHA1_CTX sha1_ctx = ssl->dc->sha1_ctx;
+
+ if (label)
+ {
+ strcpy((char *)q, label);
+ q += strlen(label);
+ }
+
+ MD5_Final(q, &md5_ctx);
+ q += MD5_SIZE;
+
+ SHA1_Final(q, &sha1_ctx);
+ q += SHA1_SIZE;
+
+ if (label)
+ {
+ prf(ssl->dc->master_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE, mac_buf, (int)(q-mac_buf),
+ digest, SSL_FINISHED_HASH_SIZE);
+ }
+ else /* for use in a certificate verify */
+ {
+ memcpy(digest, mac_buf, MD5_SIZE + SHA1_SIZE);
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ printf("label: %s\n", label);
+ print_blob("master secret", ssl->dc->master_secret, 48);
+ print_blob("mac_buf", mac_buf, q-mac_buf);
+ print_blob("finished digest", digest, SSL_FINISHED_HASH_SIZE);
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * Retrieve (and initialise) the context of a cipher.
+ */
+static void *crypt_new(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key, uint8_t *iv, int is_decrypt)
+{
+ switch (ssl->cipher)
+ {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ case SSL_AES128_SHA:
+ {
+ AES_CTX *aes_ctx = (AES_CTX *)malloc(sizeof(AES_CTX));
+ AES_set_key(aes_ctx, key, iv, AES_MODE_128);
+
+ if (is_decrypt)
+ {
+ AES_convert_key(aes_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return (void *)aes_ctx;
+ }
+
+ case SSL_AES256_SHA:
+ {
+ AES_CTX *aes_ctx = (AES_CTX *)malloc(sizeof(AES_CTX));
+ AES_set_key(aes_ctx, key, iv, AES_MODE_256);
+
+ if (is_decrypt)
+ {
+ AES_convert_key(aes_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return (void *)aes_ctx;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_RC4_128_MD5:
+#endif
+ case SSL_RC4_128_SHA:
+ {
+ RC4_CTX *rc4_ctx = (RC4_CTX *)malloc(sizeof(RC4_CTX));
+ RC4_setup(rc4_ctx, key, 16);
+ return (void *)rc4_ctx;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL; /* its all gone wrong */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send a packet over the socket.
+ */
+static int send_raw_packet(SSL *ssl, uint8_t protocol)
+{
+ uint8_t *rec_buf = ssl->bm_all_data;
+ int pkt_size = SSL_RECORD_SIZE+ssl->bm_index;
+ int sent = 0;
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+
+ rec_buf[0] = protocol;
+ rec_buf[1] = 0x03; /* version = 3.1 (TLS) */
+ rec_buf[2] = 0x01;
+ rec_buf[3] = ssl->bm_index >> 8;
+ rec_buf[4] = ssl->bm_index & 0xff;
+
+ DISPLAY_BYTES(ssl, "sending %d bytes", ssl->bm_all_data,
+ pkt_size, pkt_size);
+
+ while (sent < pkt_size)
+ {
+ if ((ret = SOCKET_WRITE(ssl->client_fd,
+ &ssl->bm_all_data[sent], pkt_size)) < 0)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sent += ret;
+
+ /* keep going until the write buffer has some space */
+ if (sent != pkt_size)
+ {
+ fd_set wfds;
+ FD_ZERO(&wfds);
+ FD_SET(ssl->client_fd, &wfds);
+
+ if (select(ssl->client_fd + 1, NULL, &wfds, NULL, NULL) < 0)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_NEED_RECORD); /* reset for next time */
+ ssl->bm_index = 0;
+
+ if (protocol != PT_APP_PROTOCOL_DATA)
+ {
+ /* always return SSL_OK during handshake */
+ ret = SSL_OK;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send an encrypted packet with padding bytes if necessary.
+ */
+int send_packet(SSL *ssl, uint8_t protocol, const uint8_t *in, int length)
+{
+ int msg_length = length;
+ int ret, pad_bytes = 0;
+ ssl->bm_index = msg_length;
+
+ /* if our state is bad, don't bother */
+ if (ssl->hs_status == SSL_ERROR_DEAD)
+ return SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST;
+
+ if (in) /* has the buffer already been initialised? */
+ {
+ memcpy(ssl->bm_data, in, length);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_TX_ENCRYPTED))
+ {
+ int mode = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT) ?
+ SSL_CLIENT_WRITE : SSL_SERVER_WRITE;
+ uint8_t hmac_header[SSL_RECORD_SIZE];
+
+ hmac_header[0] = protocol;
+ hmac_header[1] = 0x03;
+ hmac_header[2] = 0x01;
+ hmac_header[3] = length >> 8;
+ hmac_header[4] = length & 0xff;
+
+ if (protocol == PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL)
+ {
+ DISPLAY_STATE(ssl, 1, ssl->bm_data[0], 0);
+
+ if (ssl->bm_data[0] != HS_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ {
+ add_packet(ssl, ssl->bm_data, ssl->bm_index);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* add the packet digest */
+ msg_length += ssl->cipher_info->digest_size;
+ ssl->bm_index = msg_length;
+ add_hmac_digest(ssl, mode, hmac_header, ssl->bm_data, length,
+ &ssl->bm_data[length]);
+
+ /* add padding? */
+ if (ssl->cipher_info->padding_size)
+ {
+ int last_blk_size = msg_length%ssl->cipher_info->padding_size;
+ pad_bytes = ssl->cipher_info->padding_size - last_blk_size;
+
+ /* ensure we always have at least 1 padding byte */
+ if (pad_bytes == 0)
+ pad_bytes += ssl->cipher_info->padding_size;
+
+ memset(&ssl->bm_data[msg_length], pad_bytes-1, pad_bytes);
+ msg_length += pad_bytes;
+ ssl->bm_index = msg_length;
+ }
+
+ DISPLAY_BYTES(ssl, "unencrypted write", ssl->bm_data, msg_length);
+ increment_write_sequence(ssl);
+
+ /* now encrypt the packet */
+ ssl->cipher_info->encrypt(ssl->encrypt_ctx, ssl->bm_data,
+ ssl->bm_data, msg_length);
+ }
+ else if (protocol == PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL)
+ {
+ DISPLAY_STATE(ssl, 1, ssl->bm_data[0], 0);
+
+ if (ssl->bm_data[0] != HS_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ {
+ add_packet(ssl, ssl->bm_data, ssl->bm_index);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = send_raw_packet(ssl, protocol)) <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return length; /* just return what we wanted to send */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Work out the cipher keys we are going to use for this session based on the
+ * master secret.
+ */
+static void set_key_block(SSL *ssl, int is_write)
+{
+ const cipher_info_t *ciph_info = get_cipher_info(ssl->cipher);
+ uint8_t *q;
+ uint8_t client_key[32], server_key[32]; /* big enough for AES256 */
+ uint8_t client_iv[16], server_iv[16]; /* big enough for AES128/256 */
+ int is_client = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT);
+
+ /* only do once in a handshake */
+ if (ssl->dc->key_block == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl->dc->key_block = (uint8_t *)malloc(ciph_info->key_block_size);
+
+#if 0
+ print_blob("client", ssl->dc->client_random, 32);
+ print_blob("server", ssl->dc->server_random, 32);
+ print_blob("master", ssl->dc->master_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+ generate_key_block(ssl->dc->client_random, ssl->dc->server_random,
+ ssl->dc->master_secret, ssl->dc->key_block,
+ ciph_info->key_block_size);
+#if 0
+ print_blob("keyblock", ssl->key_block, ciph_info->key_block_size);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ q = ssl->dc->key_block;
+
+ if ((is_client && is_write) || (!is_client && !is_write))
+ {
+ memcpy(ssl->client_mac, q, ciph_info->digest_size);
+ }
+
+ q += ciph_info->digest_size;
+
+ if ((!is_client && is_write) || (is_client && !is_write))
+ {
+ memcpy(ssl->server_mac, q, ciph_info->digest_size);
+ }
+
+ q += ciph_info->digest_size;
+ memcpy(client_key, q, ciph_info->key_size);
+ q += ciph_info->key_size;
+ memcpy(server_key, q, ciph_info->key_size);
+ q += ciph_info->key_size;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ if (ciph_info->iv_size) /* RC4 has no IV, AES does */
+ {
+ memcpy(client_iv, q, ciph_info->iv_size);
+ q += ciph_info->iv_size;
+ memcpy(server_iv, q, ciph_info->iv_size);
+ q += ciph_info->iv_size;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ free(is_write ? ssl->encrypt_ctx : ssl->decrypt_ctx);
+
+ /* now initialise the ciphers */
+ if (is_client)
+ {
+ finished_digest(ssl, server_finished, ssl->dc->final_finish_mac);
+
+ if (is_write)
+ ssl->encrypt_ctx = crypt_new(ssl, client_key, client_iv, 0);
+ else
+ ssl->decrypt_ctx = crypt_new(ssl, server_key, server_iv, 1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ finished_digest(ssl, client_finished, ssl->dc->final_finish_mac);
+
+ if (is_write)
+ ssl->encrypt_ctx = crypt_new(ssl, server_key, server_iv, 0);
+ else
+ ssl->decrypt_ctx = crypt_new(ssl, client_key, client_iv, 1);
+ }
+
+ ssl->cipher_info = ciph_info;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the SSL connection.
+ */
+int basic_read(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **in_data)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+ int read_len, is_client = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT);
+ uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+
+ read_len = SOCKET_READ(ssl->client_fd, &buf[ssl->bm_read_index],
+ ssl->need_bytes-ssl->got_bytes);
+
+ /* connection has gone, so die */
+ if (read_len <= 0)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST;
+ ssl->hs_status = SSL_ERROR_DEAD; /* make sure it stays dead */
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ DISPLAY_BYTES(ssl, "received %d bytes",
+ &ssl->bm_data[ssl->bm_read_index], read_len, read_len);
+
+ ssl->got_bytes += read_len;
+ ssl->bm_read_index += read_len;
+
+ /* haven't quite got what we want, so try again later */
+ if (ssl->got_bytes < ssl->need_bytes)
+ return SSL_OK;
+
+ read_len = ssl->got_bytes;
+ ssl->got_bytes = 0;
+
+ if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_NEED_RECORD))
+ {
+ /* check for sslv2 "client hello" */
+ if (buf[0] & 0x80 && buf[2] == 1 && buf[3] == 0x03)
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_ENABLE_V23_HANDSHAKE
+ DISPLAY_BYTES(ssl, "ssl2 record", buf, 5);
+ add_packet(ssl, &buf[2], 3);
+ ret = process_sslv23_client_hello(ssl);
+#else
+ printf("Error: no SSLv23 handshaking allowed\n"); TTY_FLUSH();
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
+ goto error; /* not an error - just get out of here */
+ }
+
+ ssl->need_bytes = (buf[3] << 8) + buf[4];
+
+ /* do we violate the spec with the message size? */
+ if (ssl->need_bytes > RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+RT_EXTRA-BM_RECORD_OFFSET)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_PROT_MSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ CLR_SSL_FLAG(SSL_NEED_RECORD);
+ memcpy(ssl->hmac_header, buf, 3); /* store for hmac */
+ ssl->record_type = buf[0];
+ goto error; /* no error, we're done */
+ }
+
+ /* for next time - just do it now in case of an error */
+ SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_NEED_RECORD);
+ ssl->need_bytes = SSL_RECORD_SIZE;
+
+ /* decrypt if we need to */
+ if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_RX_ENCRYPTED))
+ {
+ ssl->cipher_info->decrypt(ssl->decrypt_ctx, buf, buf, read_len);
+ read_len = verify_digest(ssl,
+ is_client ? SSL_CLIENT_READ : SSL_SERVER_READ, buf, read_len);
+
+ /* does the hmac work? */
+ if (read_len < 0)
+ {
+ ret = read_len;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ DISPLAY_BYTES(ssl, "decrypted", buf, read_len);
+ increment_read_sequence(ssl);
+ }
+
+ /* The main part of the SSL packet */
+ switch (ssl->record_type)
+ {
+ case PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL:
+ ssl->dc->bm_proc_index = 0;
+ ret = do_handshake(ssl, buf, read_len);
+ break;
+
+ case PT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ if (ssl->next_state != HS_FINISHED)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* all encrypted from now on */
+ SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_RX_ENCRYPTED);
+ set_key_block(ssl, 0);
+ memset(ssl->read_sequence, 0, 8);
+ break;
+
+ case PT_APP_PROTOCOL_DATA:
+ if (in_data)
+ {
+ *in_data = ssl->bm_data; /* point to the work buffer */
+ (*in_data)[read_len] = 0; /* null terminate just in case */
+ }
+
+ ret = read_len;
+ break;
+
+ case PT_ALERT_PROTOCOL:
+ /* return the alert # with alert bit set */
+ ret = -buf[1];
+ DISPLAY_ALERT(ssl, buf[1]);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_PROT_MSG;
+ break;
+ }
+
+error:
+ ssl->bm_read_index = 0; /* reset to go again */
+
+ if (ret < SSL_OK && in_data)/* if all wrong, then clear this buffer ptr */
+ *in_data = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Do some basic checking of data and then perform the appropriate handshaking.
+ */
+static int do_handshake(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int read_len)
+{
+ int hs_len = (buf[2]<<8) + buf[3];
+ uint8_t handshake_type = buf[0];
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+ int is_client = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT);
+
+ /* some integrity checking on the handshake */
+ PARANOIA_CHECK(read_len-SSL_HS_HDR_SIZE, hs_len);
+
+ if (handshake_type != ssl->next_state)
+ {
+ /* handle a special case on the client */
+ if (!is_client || handshake_type != HS_CERT_REQ ||
+ ssl->next_state != HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HANDSHAKE;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hs_len += SSL_HS_HDR_SIZE; /* adjust for when adding packets */
+ ssl->bm_index = hs_len; /* store the size and check later */
+ DISPLAY_STATE(ssl, 0, handshake_type, 0);
+
+ if (handshake_type != HS_CERT_VERIFY && handshake_type != HS_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ add_packet(ssl, buf, hs_len);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SSL_ENABLE_CLIENT)
+ ret = is_client ?
+ do_clnt_handshake(ssl, handshake_type, buf, hs_len) :
+ do_svr_handshake(ssl, handshake_type, buf, hs_len);
+#else
+ ret = do_svr_handshake(ssl, handshake_type, buf, hs_len);
+#endif
+
+ /* just use recursion to get the rest */
+ if (hs_len < read_len && ret == SSL_OK)
+ ret = do_handshake(ssl, &buf[hs_len], read_len-hs_len);
+
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sends the change cipher spec message. We have just read a finished message
+ * from the client.
+ */
+int send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = send_packet(ssl, PT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ g_chg_cipher_spec_pkt, sizeof(g_chg_cipher_spec_pkt));
+ SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_TX_ENCRYPTED);
+ set_key_block(ssl, 1);
+ memset(ssl->write_sequence, 0, 8);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send a "finished" message
+ */
+int send_finished(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+
+ buf[0] = HS_FINISHED;
+ buf[1] = 0;
+ buf[2] = 0;
+ buf[3] = SSL_FINISHED_HASH_SIZE;
+
+ /* now add the finished digest mac (12 bytes) */
+ finished_digest(ssl,
+ IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT) ?
+ client_finished : server_finished, &buf[4]);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE
+ /* store in the session cache */
+ if (!IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_SESSION_RESUME) && ssl->ssl_ctx->num_sessions)
+ {
+ memcpy(ssl->session->master_secret,
+ ssl->dc->master_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return send_packet(ssl, PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL,
+ NULL, SSL_FINISHED_HASH_SIZE+4);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send an alert message.
+ * Return 1 if the alert was an "error".
+ */
+int send_alert(SSL *ssl, int error_code)
+{
+ int alert_num = 0;
+ int is_warning = 0;
+ uint8_t buf[2];
+
+ /* Don't bother we're already dead */
+ if (ssl->hs_status == SSL_ERROR_DEAD)
+ {
+ return SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+ if (IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_DISPLAY_STATES))
+ ssl_display_error(error_code);
+#endif
+
+ switch (error_code)
+ {
+ case SSL_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ is_warning = 1;
+ alert_num = SSL_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST: /* don't send alert just yet */
+ is_warning = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HANDSHAKE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_PROT_MSG:
+ alert_num = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HMAC:
+ case SSL_ERROR_FINISHED_INVALID:
+ alert_num = SSL_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION:
+ alert_num = SSL_ALERT_INVALID_VERSION;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION:
+ case SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHER:
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
+ alert_num = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ alert_num = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* a catch-all for any badly verified certificates */
+ alert_num = (error_code <= SSL_X509_OFFSET) ?
+ SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE : SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = is_warning ? 1 : 2;
+ buf[1] = alert_num;
+ send_packet(ssl, PT_ALERT_PROTOCOL, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ DISPLAY_ALERT(ssl, alert_num);
+ return is_warning ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Process a client finished message.
+ */
+int process_finished(SSL *ssl, int hs_len)
+{
+ uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+ int is_client = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT);
+ int resume = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_SESSION_RESUME);
+
+ PARANOIA_CHECK(ssl->bm_index, SSL_FINISHED_HASH_SIZE+4);
+
+ /* check that we all work before we continue */
+ if (memcmp(ssl->dc->final_finish_mac, &buf[4], SSL_FINISHED_HASH_SIZE))
+ return SSL_ERROR_FINISHED_INVALID;
+
+ if ((!is_client && !resume) || (is_client && resume))
+ {
+ if ((ret = send_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) == SSL_OK)
+ ret = send_finished(ssl);
+ }
+
+ /* if we ever renegotiate */
+ ssl->next_state = is_client ? HS_HELLO_REQUEST : HS_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ ssl->hs_status = ret; /* set the final handshake status */
+
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Send a certificate.
+ */
+int send_certificate(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ uint8_t *buf = ssl->bm_data;
+ int offset = 7;
+ int chain_length;
+
+ buf[0] = HS_CERTIFICATE;
+ buf[1] = 0;
+ buf[4] = 0;
+
+ while (i < ssl->ssl_ctx->chain_length)
+ {
+ SSL_CERT *cert = &ssl->ssl_ctx->certs[i];
+ buf[offset++] = 0;
+ buf[offset++] = cert->size >> 8; /* cert 1 length */
+ buf[offset++] = cert->size & 0xff;
+ memcpy(&buf[offset], cert->buf, cert->size);
+ offset += cert->size;
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ chain_length = offset - 7;
+ buf[5] = chain_length >> 8; /* cert chain length */
+ buf[6] = chain_length & 0xff;
+ chain_length += 3;
+ buf[2] = chain_length >> 8; /* handshake length */
+ buf[3] = chain_length & 0xff;
+ ssl->bm_index = offset;
+ return send_packet(ssl, PT_HANDSHAKE_PROTOCOL, NULL, offset);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a blob of memory that we'll get rid of once the handshake is
+ * complete.
+ */
+void disposable_new(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ if (ssl->dc == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl->dc = (DISPOSABLE_CTX *)calloc(1, sizeof(DISPOSABLE_CTX));
+ MD5_Init(&ssl->dc->md5_ctx);
+ SHA1_Init(&ssl->dc->sha1_ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove the temporary blob of memory.
+ */
+void disposable_free(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ if (ssl->dc)
+ {
+ free(ssl->dc->key_block);
+ memset(ssl->dc, 0, sizeof(DISPOSABLE_CTX));
+ free(ssl->dc);
+ ssl->dc = NULL;
+ }
+
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE /* no session resumption in this mode */
+/**
+ * Find if an existing session has the same session id. If so, use the
+ * master secret from this session for session resumption.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_update(int max_sessions, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessions[],
+ SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *session_id)
+{
+ time_t tm = time(NULL);
+ time_t oldest_sess_time = tm;
+ SSL_SESSION *oldest_sess = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ /* no sessions? Then bail */
+ if (max_sessions == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ if (session_id)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < max_sessions; i++)
+ {
+ if (ssl_sessions[i])
+ {
+ /* kill off any expired sessions */
+ if (tm > ssl_sessions[i]->conn_time + SSL_EXPIRY_TIME)
+ {
+ session_free(ssl_sessions, i);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* if the session id matches, it must still be less than
+ the expiry time */
+ if (memcmp(ssl_sessions[i]->session_id, session_id,
+ SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE) == 0)
+ {
+ ssl->session_index = i;
+ memcpy(ssl->dc->master_secret,
+ ssl_sessions[i]->master_secret, SSL_SECRET_SIZE);
+ SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_SESSION_RESUME);
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ return ssl_sessions[i]; /* a session was found */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we've got here, no matching session was found - so create one */
+ for (i = 0; i < max_sessions; i++)
+ {
+ if (ssl_sessions[i] == NULL)
+ {
+ /* perfect, this will do */
+ ssl_sessions[i] = (SSL_SESSION *)calloc(1, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ ssl_sessions[i]->conn_time = tm;
+ ssl->session_index = i;
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ return ssl_sessions[i]; /* return the session object */
+ }
+ else if (ssl_sessions[i]->conn_time <= oldest_sess_time)
+ {
+ /* find the oldest session */
+ oldest_sess_time = ssl_sessions[i]->conn_time;
+ oldest_sess = ssl_sessions[i];
+ ssl->session_index = i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ok, we've used up all of our sessions. So blow the oldest session away */
+ oldest_sess->conn_time = tm;
+ memset(oldest_sess->session_id, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION_ID_SIZE));
+ memset(oldest_sess->master_secret, 0, sizeof(SSL_SECRET_SIZE));
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ return oldest_sess;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Free an existing session.
+ */
+static void session_free(SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessions[], int sess_index)
+{
+ if (ssl_sessions[sess_index])
+ {
+ free(ssl_sessions[sess_index]);
+ ssl_sessions[sess_index] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * This ssl object doesn't want this session anymore.
+ */
+void kill_ssl_session(SSL_SESSION **ssl_sessions, SSL *ssl)
+{
+ SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+ if (ssl->ssl_ctx->num_sessions)
+ {
+ session_free(ssl_sessions, ssl->session_index);
+ ssl->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_SKELETON_MODE */
+
+/*
+ * Get the session id for a handshake. This will be a 32 byte sequence.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC const uint8_t * STDCALL ssl_get_session_id(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->session_id;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the session id size for a handshake.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC uint8_t STDCALL ssl_get_session_id_size(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->sess_id_size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the cipher id (in the SSL form).
+ */
+EXP_FUNC uint8_t STDCALL ssl_get_cipher_id(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->cipher;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the status of the handshake.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_handshake_status(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->hs_status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve various parameters about the SSL engine.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_get_config(int offset)
+{
+ switch (offset)
+ {
+ /* return the appropriate build mode */
+ case SSL_BUILD_MODE:
+#if defined(CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE)
+ return SSL_BUILD_FULL_MODE;
+#elif defined(CONFIG_SSL_ENABLE_CLIENT)
+ return SSL_BUILD_ENABLE_CLIENT;
+#elif defined(CONFIG_ENABLE_VERIFICATION)
+ return SSL_BUILD_ENABLE_VERIFICATION;
+#elif defined(CONFIG_SSL_SERVER_ONLY )
+ return SSL_BUILD_SERVER_ONLY;
+#else
+ return SSL_BUILD_SKELETON_MODE;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_MAX_CERT_CFG_OFFSET:
+ return CONFIG_SSL_MAX_CERTS;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+ case SSL_MAX_CA_CERT_CFG_OFFSET:
+ return CONFIG_X509_MAX_CA_CERTS;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_HAS_PEM
+ case SSL_HAS_PEM:
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION
+/**
+ * Authenticate a received certificate.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_verify_cert(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int ret;
+ SSL_CTX_LOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+ ret = x509_verify(ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx, ssl->x509_ctx);
+ SSL_CTX_UNLOCK(ssl->ssl_ctx->mutex);
+
+ if (ret) /* modify into an SSL error type */
+ {
+ ret = SSL_X509_ERROR(ret);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Process a certificate message.
+ */
+int process_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509_CTX **x509_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_OK;
+ uint8_t *buf = &ssl->bm_data[ssl->dc->bm_proc_index];
+ int pkt_size = ssl->bm_index;
+ int cert_size, offset = 5;
+ int total_cert_size = (buf[offset]<<8) + buf[offset+1];
+ int is_client = IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_IS_CLIENT);
+ X509_CTX **chain = x509_ctx;
+ offset += 2;
+
+ PARANOIA_CHECK(total_cert_size, offset);
+
+ while (offset < total_cert_size)
+ {
+ offset++; /* skip empty char */
+ cert_size = (buf[offset]<<8) + buf[offset+1];
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if (x509_new(&buf[offset], NULL, chain))
+ {
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* DISPLAY_CERT(ssl, *chain); */
+ chain = &((*chain)->next);
+ offset += cert_size;
+ }
+
+ PARANOIA_CHECK(pkt_size, offset);
+
+ /* if we are client we can do the verify now or later */
+ if (is_client && !IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_LATER))
+ {
+ ret = ssl_verify_cert(ssl);
+ }
+
+ ssl->next_state = is_client ? HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE : HS_CLIENT_KEY_XCHG;
+ ssl->dc->bm_proc_index += offset;
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION */
+
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display SSL handshaking stuff.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display SSL states.
+ */
+void DISPLAY_STATE(SSL *ssl, int is_send, uint8_t state, int not_ok)
+{
+ const char *str;
+
+ if (!IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_DISPLAY_STATES))
+ return;
+
+ printf(not_ok ? "Error - invalid State:\t" : "State:\t");
+ printf(is_send ? "sending " : "receiving ");
+
+ switch (state)
+ {
+ case HS_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ str = "Hello Request (0)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ str = "Client Hello (1)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_SERVER_HELLO:
+ str = "Server Hello (2)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_CERTIFICATE:
+ str = "Certificate (11)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_SERVER_KEY_XCHG:
+ str = "Certificate Request (12)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_CERT_REQ:
+ str = "Certificate Request (13)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ str = "Server Hello Done (14)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_CERT_VERIFY:
+ str = "Certificate Verify (15)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_CLIENT_KEY_XCHG:
+ str = "Client Key Exchange (16)";
+ break;
+
+ case HS_FINISHED:
+ str = "Finished (16)";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ str = "Error (Unknown)";
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printf("%s\n", str);
+ TTY_FLUSH();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display X509 certificates.
+ */
+void DISPLAY_CERT(SSL *ssl, const X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+ if (!IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_DISPLAY_CERTS))
+ return;
+
+ x509_print(x509_ctx, ssl->ssl_ctx->ca_cert_ctx);
+ TTY_FLUSH();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display RSA objects
+ */
+void DISPLAY_RSA(SSL *ssl, const RSA_CTX *rsa_ctx)
+{
+ if (!IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_DISPLAY_RSA))
+ return;
+
+ RSA_print(rsa_ctx);
+ TTY_FLUSH();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display SSL handshaking bytes.
+ */
+void DISPLAY_BYTES(SSL *ssl, const char *format,
+ const uint8_t *data, int size, ...)
+{
+ va_list(ap);
+
+ if (!IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_DISPLAY_BYTES))
+ return;
+
+ va_start(ap, size);
+ print_blob(format, data, size, va_arg(ap, char *));
+ va_end(ap);
+ TTY_FLUSH();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display SSL handshaking errors.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC void STDCALL ssl_display_error(int error_code)
+{
+ if (error_code == SSL_OK)
+ return;
+
+ printf("Error: ");
+
+ /* X509 error? */
+ if (error_code < SSL_X509_OFFSET)
+ {
+ printf("%s\n", x509_display_error(error_code - SSL_X509_OFFSET));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL alert error code */
+ if (error_code > SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST)
+ {
+ printf("SSL error %d\n", -error_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (error_code)
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_DEAD:
+ printf("connection dead");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HANDSHAKE:
+ printf("invalid handshake");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_PROT_MSG:
+ printf("invalid protocol message");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HMAC:
+ printf("invalid mac");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION:
+ printf("invalid version");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION:
+ printf("invalid session");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHER:
+ printf("no cipher");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST:
+ printf("connection lost");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ printf("bad certificate");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
+ printf("invalid key");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_FINISHED_INVALID:
+ printf("finished invalid");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_NO_CERT_DEFINED:
+ printf("no certificate defined");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+ printf("Option not supported");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printf("undefined as yet - %d", error_code);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printf("\n");
+ TTY_FLUSH();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Debugging routine to display alerts.
+ */
+void DISPLAY_ALERT(SSL *ssl, int alert)
+{
+ if (!IS_SET_SSL_FLAG(SSL_DISPLAY_STATES))
+ return;
+
+ printf("Alert: ");
+
+ switch (alert)
+ {
+ case SSL_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ printf("close notify");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_INVALID_VERSION:
+ printf("invalid version");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ printf("bad certificate");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ printf("unexpected message");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ printf("bad record mac");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ printf("handshake failure");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ printf("illegal parameter");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR:
+ printf("decode error");
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ printf("decrypt error");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printf("alert - (unknown %d)", alert);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printf("\n");
+ TTY_FLUSH();
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE */
+
+/**
+ * Return the version of this library.
+ */
+EXP_FUNC const char * STDCALL ssl_version()
+{
+ static const char * axtls_version = AXTLS_VERSION;
+ return axtls_version;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Enable the various language bindings to work regardless of the
+ * configuration - they just return an error statement and a bad return code.
+ */
+#if !defined(CONFIG_SSL_FULL_MODE)
+EXP_FUNC void STDCALL ssl_display_error(int error_code) {}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BINDINGS
+#if !defined(CONFIG_SSL_ENABLE_CLIENT)
+EXP_FUNC SSL * STDCALL ssl_client_new(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, int client_fd, const
+ uint8_t *session_id, uint8_t sess_id_size)
+{
+ printf(unsupported_str);
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION)
+EXP_FUNC int STDCALL ssl_verify_cert(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ printf(unsupported_str);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+EXP_FUNC const char * STDCALL ssl_get_cert_dn(const SSL *ssl, int component)
+{
+ printf(unsupported_str);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_BINDINGS */
+
projects / project / luci.git / blobdiff