From 8f65c114f4698150663b5b69821113f47f97c586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: nbd Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 17:04:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: fix post v2.4 security issues - WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser (CVE-2015-4141) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm (CVE-2015-4143) - EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm (CVE-2015-4143) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly (CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145) - EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly (CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior (CVE-2015-4146) - NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser (CVE-2015-8041) - WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no PMF in use (CVE-2015-5310) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation (CVE-2015-5315) - EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation (CVE-2015-5314) - EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message (CVE-2015-5316) Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann Backport of r48185 git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/chaos_calmer@48186 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73 --- ...Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch | 49 +++++++++++++++ ...r-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++ ...ver-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++++ ...r-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++ ...ver-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++ ...eer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch | 32 ++++++++++ ...load-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch | 61 ++++++++++++++++++ ...Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch | 32 ++++++++++ ...-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch | 54 ++++++++++++++++ ...erver-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch | 51 +++++++++++++++ ...r-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch | 34 ++++++++++ 11 files changed, 554 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..36b4ca2946 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser + +strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and +resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could +result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length +argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. + +This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that +has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This +would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with +upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER +(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). + +Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to +rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be +larger than the maximum configured body length. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c +index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644 +--- a/src/wps/httpread.c ++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c +@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) + goto bad; + h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); ++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || ++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", ++ h->chunk_size); ++ goto bad; ++ } + /* throw away chunk header + * so we have only real data + */ +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..91627fb7b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index f2b0926..a629437 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + u16 offset; + u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; ++ ++ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } + + if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || +@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* + * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | + * prf +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5dca20b277 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; + int res = 0; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); + ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || +@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ + grp = htons(data->group_num); + ptr = (u8 *) &cs; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d2f9d8aef --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment + reassembly + +The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the +Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked +prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could +have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted +as a huge positive integer. + +In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress +before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a +potential memory leak when processing invalid message. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index a629437..1d2079b 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose " + "total length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return NULL; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer " +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7edef099eb --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment + reassembly + +The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the +Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked +prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could +have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted +as a huge positive integer. + +In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress +before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a +potential memory leak when processing invalid message. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * the first fragment has a total length + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ return; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total " + "length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ return; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to " +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a601323f14 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior + +The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding +whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This +fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid +for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in +triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process +due to invalid buffer allocation. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * we have output! Do we need to fragment it? + */ ++ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch); + len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf); + if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu, +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd3462465e --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser + +It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up +wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload +length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to +2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large +payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20 +bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process. +This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of +heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the +same length which would most likely result in the process termination. +In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there +would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an +infinite loop in ndef_parse_records(). + +Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service +attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or +sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing +the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the +received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack +that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing, +hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included +here. + +Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that +detects integer overflow. (CID 122668) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c +index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644 +--- a/src/wps/ndef.c ++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c +@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, + if (size < 6) + return -1; + record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos); ++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6) ++ return -1; + pos += sizeof(u32); + } + +@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, + pos += record->payload_length; + + record->total_length = pos - data; +- if (record->total_length > size) ++ if (record->total_length > size || ++ record->total_length < record->payload_length) + return -1; + return 0; + } +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..00e5b7c771 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no + PMF in use + +WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is +enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station +side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +index 954de67..7d79499 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + end = ptr + key_len_total; + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); + ++ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) { ++ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, ++ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + while (ptr + 1 < end) { + if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82c26398b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5315) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * buffer and ACK the fragment + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + data->in_frag_pos += len; + if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " +@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + return NULL; + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, + EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); +@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * we're buffering and this is the last fragment + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", + (int) len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + } +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfc4c74e95 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5314) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + /* + * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " + "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", +@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + data->in_frag_pos += len; ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", + (int) len); + return; +@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3088f6a6dc --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/013-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message + +If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity +exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and +data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() +did not take this corner case into account and could end up +dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid +message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 75ceef1..892b590 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); + + fin: +- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); ++ if (data->grp) ++ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); + BN_clear_free(x); + BN_clear_free(y); + if (data->outbuf == NULL) { +-- +1.9.1 + -- 2.11.0